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VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Richmond, Virginia - February 24, 1981 
SECTION ONE 
1. John Doe filed an action at law against Bob Barrister 
a.~11eging that Doe and Barrister were both residents of Williamsburg, 
yirginia; that Doe had employed Barrister to prepare the estate tax 
return for~_ the estate of Doe's father, of whom Doe was the sole 
~~neficiary; that Barrister had failed to list in the tax return 
~~rtain policies of insurance as a part of the assets of the dec2-
~ent 1 s estate, even though Barrister had been informed of their 
existence; and that by reason thereof, Doe was obliged to pay pen-
ilties to the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of $6,000. 
Doe had first contacted Barrister on June 5, 1977, and the tax 
return was filed on July 3rd of that year. Doe's suit was instituted 
~gainst Barrister on June 15, 1980. 
Barrister filed his grounds of defense, including a plea 
bf the applicable statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 
The parties then engaged in extensive discovery procedures which 
~arried through the fall and winter of 1980. In January of 1981 
~oe realized that a specific bequest contained in his father's 
will could have qualified for a charitable deduction against the 
estate tax but it had not been so listed in the tax return, by 
reason of which the estate was obliged to pay $2,500 more in estate 
taxes than the law properly required. Doe also found that on Septem-
.ber 10, 1977, Barrister had failed to include a small parcel of 
land in his preparation of a deed conveying to Doe certain real 
estate which he had purchased. By reason of the foregoing, Doe 
on January 20, 1981 petitioned the Court for leave (which was grant-
ed) to amend his motion for judgment to add two claims: (1) in 
the amount of $2,500 for the additional taxes paid by reason of 
~arrister's failure to prepare the estate tax return properly, 
and (2) in the sum of $1,000 for the expenses to which he would 
be put in obtaining a correction deed to remedy Barrister's error 
ih the deed prepared in September of 1977. Barrister filed a plea 
of the applicable statute of limitations as to each claim. How 
should the Court rule on Barrister's plea of the statute of limi-
tations as to (a) the claim for penalties stated in the original 
complaint, (b) the amended claim relating to additional taxes, 
and (c) the amended claim relating to the erroneous deed? 
* * * 
2. Glenda Graceful, an unmarried adult living in Staunton, 
Virginia,. was struck by a car driven by another Staunton resident, 
vs 
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William Wheels, while Glenda was walking across the street in front 
of her home. Glenda was seriously injured and suffered a partial 
permanent disability of her right ankle. Some six months after 
the accident, Graceful filed a Motion for Judgment against Wheels 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Staunton demanding damages 
in the amount of $75,000. Wheels filed his Grounds of Defense deny-
ing negligence on his part and affirmatively charging Glenda with 
fOntributory negligence. 
~· The case was tried to a jury and at the conclusion of Glenda's 
evidence, Wheels moved the Court to strike the plaintiff's evidence 
And enter judgment on behalf of the defendant. This motion was 
~verruled by the trial court~ Wheels then put on his evidence, 
~nd the parties rested. Counsel then met with the Court to review 
~the tendered jury instructions, and seven instructions were granted 
~y the Court as to which Wheels voiced strenuous objection to two, 
dictating the grounds of his exceptions into the record. Thereafter, 
the jury retired and rendered a verdict of $42,500 for the plain-
tiff. Judgment was, accordingly, entered on the verdict. 
The next day the defendant, Wheels, filed a motion to set 
.aside the verdict as being contrary to law and evidence and based 
~on improper instructions. The plaintiff objected to defendant's 
.motion on two grounds: (a) that the Court had already ruled on 
the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence and the instructions and 
.its decision on those aspects of the trial was final; and (b) that 
the defendant was estopped from any further challenge as to the 
$Ufficiency of the evidence as he had chosen to rely on a motion 
to strike at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence. 
How should the Court rule on each ground of plaintiff's ob-
jections to defendant's motion? 
* * * 
3. Bob Bundy, a resident of Hopewell, Virginia, made an 
application for a loan at the Twin Cities Savings and Loan Associ-
ation, a Virginia corporation, located between Petersburg and Hope-
well, Virginia. Included in the settlement papers was a form, re-
quired by the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1601, 
under which the borrower was required to indicate whether he desired 
$15,000 in credit life, accident, health or loss of income insur-
ance. Although the Truth in Lending Act did not require the issuance 
of the policy, the Savings and Loan Association agreed to obtain 
the policy at the request and at the expense of the borrower. Bundy 
requested such coverage and the loan was closed. Shortly thereafter, 
Bundy was struck by a car and killed. His wife, Mildred, who quali-
fied as executrix of his estate, inquired of the Savings and Loan 
Association as to the steps she would have to take to apply for 
the benefits of the insurance policy, only to be told that no cover-
age had, in fact, been obtained. 
After consultation with her attorney, Mrs. Bundy filed suit 
in the United States District Court in Richmond seeking damages 
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in the amount of $15,000 as a result of the failure of the Savings 
and Loan Association to procure the insurance for which Bob Bundy 
bad applied. The Savings and Loan Association filed a motion to 
1dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Did the Court have jurisdiction? 
4. William ·Whitby was tried before a jury in the Circuit 
Court of Virginia Beach on a charge of armed robbery. The evidence 
against him was based on an identification of Whitby by the victim, 
Walter Wallaby, first made in police headquarters while Whitby 
was standing in a small room in the custody of two police officers. 
At the trial, Whitby's attorney made no objection to the admissi-
~ility of Wallaby's testimony when Wallaby again identified Whitby 
as the man who robbed him. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's 
evidence, Whitby's counsel moved to strike the Commonwealth's evi-
"ence on the ground that the in-court identification resulted from 
~ah "unconstitutional lineup or identification procedure" conducted 
~t police headquarters in the absence of counsel and under very 
~uggestive circumstances. How should the Court rule on Whitby's 
;motion to strike? 
·k * * 
5. In a chancery suit commenced in the Circuit Court of 
?Augusta County, Virginia, the court heard the evidence ore tenus. 
1Upon the conclusion of the evidence, and after hearing argument 
~of counsel, the court entered an interlocutory order adjudicating 
~ertain matters, and retained the cause upon the docket for further 
}proceedings that were deemed necessary before a final decree could 
.~e entered. Before a final decree was entered the lawyer for the 
.~efendant in the suit concluded that the court had misconstrued 
~he law and had thus committed error in entering the interlocutory 
torder. Also, following the entry of the interlocutory order, the 
Jde:fendant advised his lawyer that he had, for the first time, learn-
·~£ new and material evidence that might well alter the finding 
~pon which the interlocutory order was based. 
What, if anything, may the lawyer for the defendant do, prior 
to the entry of the final decree, in an effort to correct what 
.were considered to be errors of law in the judgment of the court, 
and to secure findings of fact favorable to the defendant? · 
* * * 
6. Solicitor, an attorney practicing law in West Virginia, 
addressed a letter to Barrister, an attorney practicing law in 
1Richmond, Virginia. In that lett~r Solicitor advised that his client 
had some claims against a Virginia resident living in Richmond 
rthat would have to be asserted in a court of equity in Virginia, 
Snd he requested Barrister to be associated with him in representing 
his client. In the letter Solicitor inquired of Barrister: (a) 
how a suit in equity is commenced in Virginia; (b) if a defendant 
~ecides to file a motion to quash process or a motion challenging 
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necessary that this be done upon a special appearance; 
• c) if the motion to quash process is filed and overruled, when 
must defendant answer the bill of complaint, and if a motion to 
buash is not filed, when must an answer be filed by the defendant; 
d) if defendant decides to file a cross-bill, within what time 
ust it be filed; and (c) if a cross-bill is filed by the defendant 
gainst the plaintiff, within what period of time must responsive 
leadings be filed by the plaintiff. 
What response should Barrister make to the inquiries directed 
y the letter? 
7. Al Sport, an antique car buff living in Norfolk, Virginia, 
as interested in purchasing a Duesenberg Roadster.owned by Sam 
echanic, a resident of Roanoke, Virginia. On April 17, 1980, Sport 
ddressed a letter to his friend, John Cook; in Roanoke, with a 
ppy to Mechanic, requesting Cook to represent him as his agent 
n purchasing the antique Duesenberg. Sport offered to pay Cook 
or his services a fee of 10% of the purchase price .. With the letter 
o Cook, Sport enclosed a proposed written contract, q(-:safe with 
he purchase price being left blank. The proposed cdrit;'ract was 
igned by Sport at the time it was mailed to Cook •. 'l)Jq\days, after 
ook and Mechanic received the letter from Sport,- CoOk: received 
telegram from Sport instructing him not to purchase'die···car and 
o return the proposed contract to him. On the same diY that the 
elegram was sent to Cook, Sport addressed and posted ~ letter to 
echanic advising him that he was no longer interested in purchasing 
he car, and that he had cancelled Cook's authority to act in his 
ehalf. After Cook had received the telegram, he immediately pre-
ented the written contract, which included the amount of the pur-
hase price, to Mechanic who signed it and delivered it back to 
ook. The contract provided that the car would be delivered to 
port five days after the signing of the contract. A few hours 
fter Mechanic signed the contract, he received the letter sent 
~him by Sport terminating Cook's authority to act for him as 
is agent. Mechanic consults you inquiring whether the contract 
s binding upon Sport. 
What would you adivse? 
;': * ;" 
8. Chuck Clearcut purchased some unfenced timber land in 
Botetourt County, Virginia. Before purchasing the land the owner 
took Clearcut on the property and showed him what he claimed were 
he boundary lines. The deed conveying the property to Clearcut 
escribed the property as containing 2,500 acres. A survey would 
ave revealed that there were actually only 2,000 acres in the 
roperty he had purchased; however, Clearcut did not have the prop-
erty surveyed. Believing that he owned the entire 2,500 acres de-
scribed in the deed and within the boundary lines shown to him 
by the seller, he immediately moved his crews onto the land and 
,cut all the timber on the 2,500 acres~ which included 500 acres 
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belonging to Dan Derelict. After cutting the timber, Clearcut had 
it milled into finished lumber of various grades, which he comin-
gled with his other existing inventory. The value of Derelict's 
timber on the stump at the time of the cutting was $20,000, and 
~he value of the finished lumber milled from .Derelict's trees had 
a total value of $100,000. 
~ Derelict went to his property to go hunting and discovered 
'learcut' s timber crews had cut his trees. Derelict immediately 
onfronted Clearcut and demanded that he be paid $100,000 for the 
irnber which had been cut. When shown Derelict's deed, Clearcut 
drnitted his mistake in cutting Derelict's trees and offered to 
ay him $20,000 for the trees, the admitted fair market value of 
he standing trees. 
Before accepting Clearcut's offer, Derelict consulted his 
ttorney as to what rights, if any, he may have in the lumber pro-
duced from his trees. 
What should his attorney adivse him? 
9. On April 1, 1979, Sam Spendthrift and Sally Spendthrift, 
his wife, executed a general deed of assignment by which theTcon-
veyed to Torn Terry, trustee, all their assets, both real and p~r­
sonal, for the benefit of all their creditors. Included in the 
properties conveyed was Blackacre, a tract of land containing 600 
ftcres, upon which the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, the only 
lien creditor, held a first deed of trust securing a debt to the 
~ank with an unpaid balance of $10,250. The deed to Terry provided 
~hat he should convert all. the property conveyed to him to cash 
as soon as possible and that "upon the conversion [the trustee 
~hall] pay all taxes and all claims having priority by reason of any 
valid lien securing the same and the residue of the fund corning into 
~he hands of said trustee shall be distributed by him prorata to and 
among the creditors above named". 
On April 28, 1979 Terry filed a bill of complaint in the 
,Circuit Court of Greensville County in which he made the Spend-
. thrifts, the Bank and all other creditors parties defendant and 
by which he sought direction and guidance in the administration 
of the trust. The Bank answered the complaint by stating that it 
.had no objection to the sale of Blackacre even though debt to it 
~was not yet due. 
Pursuant to an order of the court, the trustee, Tom Terry, 
sold all the property, including Blackacre, free and clear of all 
liens~ Blackacre was sold for $8,250 and all other assets were 
sold for $10,500 - a total of $18,750. The total amount of the 
debts of all creditors other than the Bank was in excess of $10,500. 
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Charles Carter, the special commissioner to whom the matter 
was referred for a report on the scheme of distribution of the 
proceeds of the sales, reported that because of the lien the Bank 
had on Blackacre it was entitled to receive the entire unpaid bal-
ance of its debt - that is, $10,250. The general creditors filed 
exceptions to the commissioner's report in the Circuit Court of 
~Greensville County in which they claimed that the Bank was entitled 
to no priority, that it should be treated as a general creditor 
and that the total proceeds from the sale - that is, $18,750 -
.should be applied prorata among all the creditors. 
How should the court rule with respect to how the proceeds 
the sale should be distributed? 
* * * ~.; -.·,. "'. ·, . . . ' 
10. By a final decree entered on Febr~ary 14, 1977 by the 
.Circuit Court of Augusta County, Virginia, Lucy Lucky and Larry 
Lucky, her husband, were divorced and Larry was ordered to pay 
Lucy the sum of $1,000 per month as alimony. On February 14, 1978, 
>Lucy married Harry Hustler. On March 18, 1978, Lucy.fil~d a bill 
of complaint against Harry Hustler in the Circuit.Goµf"t:ofRock-
.ingham County, Virginia, seeking the annulment of li.~"J;:(riiarriage 
to Harry on. the ground of Harry's fraud. 9n July 4:~;~;1~t2J§,>.that 
court, by final decree, annulled the marriage on thetg:roun~ of 
fraud and declared it to be "null, void and of no e.fJ.ect •.. ~~t 
. : ~if'.~):~~f ~tJ~t?:·'.~ .:,_:~;/' ··:·\h-.~ > 
Lucy seeks your advice whether she can obtairi'teinstatement 
of the $1,000 alimony payment from Larry Lucky that had been termi-
nated upon her marriage to Harry Hustler. What should you advise 
>Lucy with respect to that question? 
* '";~ * 
